000			01978 a2200301 4500
001			1138986658
005			20250317100420.0
008			250312042016GB eng
020			_a9781138986657
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 45.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aQRAB _2thema
072	7		_aQDTJ _2thema
072	7		_aQRYA5 _2thema
072	7		_aHRAB _2bic
072	7		_aHPJ _2bic
072	7		_aHRQA5 _2bic
072	7		_aPHI022000 _2bisac
072	7		_aREL051000 _2bisac
072	7		_aPHI000000 _2bisac
100	1		_aAlfred Cyril Ewing
245	1	0	_aValue and Reality _bThe Philosophical Case for Theism
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20160520
300			_a288 p
520			_bThis is a major work by one of the best-known philosophical writers, representing the culmination of some twenty-five years’ work on the possibility of giving a rational defence of the claims of the religious man, and specifically the theist, in the face of modern criticisms. Dr Ewing’s object has been to fulfil what seem to him the two most important tasks for the philosopher in at least the present age, namely, to see if it is still possible to give a rational defence of a genuinely religious point of view, and to do the same thing for an objective ethics, a task he has attempted in other works, and continues here. The conclusions are that while there can be no question of strict, logical proof, an ethical theism can be defended rationally as an explanatory, metaphysical hypothesis and there are no grounds to reject as illusory the most fundamental intuitive convictions of religion. The book, originally published in 1973, included a new theory of the ultimate criterion of truth for hypotheses, a restatement of the case for a substantial self and for indeterminism, a fresh treatment of the moral and certain other arguments for God, some points in the discussion of the problem of evil and some speculations on time.
999			_c3324 _d3324